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Abstract 
We use a spatial competition based model in a two-stage game setup to assess whether 
equilibrium in exchange rates among the leading currencies is attainable. We show that a stable 
equilibrium can be reached in the case of two leading currencies, but not in the case of three. In 
our model, central banks of leading currencies attract, through the workings of their objective 
and policy, small currencies that tie with leading currencies via exchange rate regimes. This can 
be thought of as a competition to link smaller currencies to a leading currency that is motivated 
by the fact that such a tie greatly reduces volatility within such an informal “currency area”. Our 
theoretical findings are supported by empirical evidence. Since firms, traders, and countries 
currently recognize three leading currencies and their economic behavior reflects this, we may 
expect disagreement on overvaluation or undervaluation of certain currencies to continue. 
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1. Introduction 
On February 6-7, 2004, the heads of central banks and the finance ministers of the G-7 countries 
gathered in Boca Raton, Florida, to discuss the development of the exchange rate between the 
US dollar and the European common currency, the euro. G-7 finance ministers and central 
bankers agreed after a two-day meeting to issue a statement that "excess volatility" and 
"disorderly movements" in exchange rates were undesirable. Translated into plain English, the 
statement implied that the dollar had fallen against the euro far enough. 
Recent developments in the foreign exchange market have formed the basis for complaints 
that the euro has borne a disproportionate share of the dollar's decline.
1 When looking at the 
situation from the perspective of a broad basket of currencies, during 2002-2003 the euro rose 
against the US dollar by roughly twice as much as the Japanese yen, the British pound or the 
Canadian dollar; but among the main currencies, it is the Australian dollar that actually recorded 
the biggest gain against the US dollar.. The currencies of emerging Asian economies other than 
China, meanwhile, moved only a little, while the Mexican peso even fell against the dollar.
2 
Overall, the dollar fell by a modest 15% against a broad basket of currencies over the 2002-2003 
period. Complaints on overvaluation or undervaluation between the US dollar and the euro have 
their predecessors in the context of the Deutsch mark and other currencies under the former 
European Monetary System (EMS) as well as in past disputes on “fair” parity between dollar and 
yen. In short, the system of exchange rates seems to be out of equilibrium, a cure is hard to find, 
and as Iida (1999) argues, international cooperation in monetary affairs may likely be very 
counterproductive.
3 Figure 1 illustrates the deviations among key currencies in the post-war 
horizon. 
In this paper we use an historical account of the post-war existing factual exchange rate 
regimes, exchange rate development, and evolution of crucial monetary variables to assess the 
likelihood of attainability of equilibrium among the leading currencies. We build on a model of 
spatial competition among the central banks of leading currencies in a two-stage game setup and 
show that stable equilibrium among the existing leading currencies cannot be achieved under the 
                                                 
1 Since 2001 to early 2004 the dollar has fallen by 33% against the euro and by 15% against the Japanese yen. 
2 Mexico is America's third-largest trading partner. 
3 Based on the theory of model uncertainty, originally proposed by Frankel (1988), the expected benefits and costs 
of cooperation depend on the model used to forecast the outcome of such cooperation; the intuition behind it is that 
“if policymakers do not know what they are doing, it is unlikely that cooperation will improve the situation” (Iida 
1999, p. 31).   2
existing world monetary arrangement.
4 
The roots of developments in the exchange rates can be traced to the origin of post-war 
development that itself can serve as a proxy for stylized facts underlying the motivation for our 
model. After World War II the international foreign exchange arrangement returned to a relaxed 
version of the Gold Standard known as the Bretton Woods System.
5 All participating currencies 
were pegged to the US dollar with a very narrow margin to move up and down. The dollar was 
then tied to the gold in fixed proportion. However, as Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004) argue, when 
market-determined rates were used instead of official rates, de facto floating was not uncommon 
even during the Bretton Woods period of pegged regime, and for many countries it was difficult 
to detect any change in exchange rate behavior between the period of peg and the period of 
general floating that followed. Since the increasing amount of dollar denominated obligations 
held by foreign holders exceeded US gold reserves, the Bretton Woods System collapsed in 
1973. 
After the collapse , the system of exchange rates clearly longed for stability and aimed to 
repair itself since, during the post-Bretton Woods period, pegs and crawling pegs were the most 
frequent exchange rate regimes used (33% and 26% respectively). Further, from 1990 to 2001 
the crawling peg was the most common type of regime in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, 
excluding Canada and the US (ibid). Such an empirical finding is supported by an earlier 
argument of Williamson (1998) that, under the conditions of high capital mobility, the more 
prudent choice should in most cases be a system of limited flexibility, in the form of a crawling 
band (a wide band that is adjusted in small steps so as to keep it in line with the fundamentals, 
but is defended in the traditional ways) or possibly a monitoring band (a wide band with similar 
properties, which is defended only when the rate goes outside the band). In a similar spirit, Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) focus on whether countries that claim their currencies are floating are indeed 
doing so. They find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not 
and conclude, with a coined term, that there seems to be an epidemic case of "fear of floating." 
The recent debate regarding stability of international monetary arrangements is rich and 
discusses the issue from a variety of angles. Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) review trends in 
                                                 
4 In no respect do we claim that central banks of leading currencies determine exchange rates. On the contrary, we 
leave this task fully on the shoulders of the market (with the exception of time-limited effect of foreign exchange 
interventions by central banks). 
5 For a review of the system as well as its lasting impressions on the world monetary landscape see for example 
Leeson (2003), Battilossi and Cassis (2002), Andrews, Henning, and Pauly (2002).   3
exchange-rate regime shifts over the post-Bretton Woods period, present a typology of regime 
changes, and address issues related to voluntary and forced exits from exchange rate regimes. 
Benassy-Querre, Fontagne, and Lahreche-Revil (2001) empirically show that exchange-rate 
volatility is detrimental to foreign direct investment (FDI) and that its impact compares with that 
of misalignments. One policy implication of their work is that the building of currency blocs 
could be a way of increasing FDI to emerging countries as a whole.
6 
The debate is not concentrated only on Europe or the United States, an impression that may 
emerge due to the stress on euro versus dollar advances. Bird and Rajan (2002), for example, 
discuss key aspects of the new Asian financial architecture and focus on the reform of domestic 
financial systems in Asia, exchange rate regimes, and regional liquidity arrangements. Madden, 
Savage, and McDonald (2000) discuss stabilizing Asia-Pacific exchange rates by establishing a 
system of pegs, bands or target zones around the Japanese yen. This requires the compromise of 
domestic policy autonomy and symmetric reaction to economic shocks to ensure the lowest cost. 
The authors suggest that the economic preconditions for a yen bloc are not in place yet. Frieden 
and Stein (2001) provide a systematic understanding of exchange rate issues by analyzing the 
political economy of currency policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The political economy of exchange rates conveys a plain message that any shift in currencies 
produces winners and losers. Since the US dollar, Japanese yen, Deutsch mark, and recently euro 
have become the leading currencies in post-war development, they also tend to be most 
vulnerable to volatility.
7 Exchange rates across the three leading currencies became particularly 
volatile in the post-1971 period and our earlier account implies the same with respect to the euro. 
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, attempts to reduce volatility of 
exchange rates in economically interconnected Europe led to creating the “Snake”
8 in 1973 and 
the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The former Deutsch mark was represented by 
the largest weight in a currency basket that was used to limit volatility of participating European 
currencies. Further economic integration evolved into the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the establishment of the European Central Bank, and the euro being adopted in 1999. 
                                                 
6 This empirically backed conclusion supports our motivation for the model outlined later in Section 2. 
7 Devereux, Engel, and Tille (2003) show that introduction of the euro could have important positive and normative 
effects for both Europe and the rest of the world. They also conjecture that the acceptance of the euro will lead 
European prices to become more insulated from exchange rate volatility. 
8 This group of countries, the so-called “Snake”, consisted of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark; it 
also included France on several occasions. In 1973, these countries fixed their exchange rates with each other while 
jointly floating against other countries.   4
Further enlargement of the EMU is expected, since countries that accessed the EU in 2004 were 
given no option but to join the EMU at a later date. For a classical in-depth analysis of the EMS, 
as well its relevance for the rest of the world, see Giavazzi and Giovanninni (1989). For a 
description of European integration around a common currency and for an explanation as to why 
many of the EU states have agreed to sacrifice their monetary independence see Overturf (2000). 
Aside from a macroeconomic account, instability in exchange rates is the main problem that 
businesses ultimately face, and with very limited space to maneuver. Various hedging 
possibilities may prevent losses to some extent but they serve as short-term solutions with a 
relatively narrow scope. Moreover, hedging instruments, while serving against loss, do not 
reduce volatility in exchange rates. Furthermore, foreign exchange market-makers may benefit 
from volatility and help to increase it as well. Firms can adjust in the medium and long term to 
different levels of exchange rate parities, but they are unable to efficiently react to volatility in 
the short run. This is due to the fact that some delivery contracts and, more importantly, wage 
contracts and investment projects are assessed, evaluated, and adopted for at least the medium 
term. The firms are unable to adapt when volatility in exchange rates erodes links among prices 
and when formerly established information, based on prices with respect to exchange rates, 
becomes highly distorted. 
As we noted earlier, we cannot expect that stability in the system of currencies is attainable. 
We aim to show this with the aid of a formal model, which is based on the simple and widely 
recognized premise that a central bank’s objective is characterized by price stability. Interest 
rate, as a main instrument, is used for conduct of bank policy. (The model and motivation for its 
use are described in detail in Section 2.) In our model, central banks of leading currencies attract, 
through the workings of their objective and policy, small currencies that tie with leading 
currencies via exchange rate regimes. This can be thought of as a competition to link smaller 
currencies to a leading currency that is motivated by the fact that a tie between small currencies 
and a leading currency greatly reduces volatility within such an informal “currency area”. 
Reduced volatility in turn promotes international trade and increased stability, further reducing 
costs of business activity. Further, countries of the small currencies benefit by enhanced price 
stability if they tie their currencies to a leading currency that experiences lower inflation. Such 
import of low inflation is theoretically grounded as well as empirically documented (see 
Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989, among others).   5
The theoretical model we present is an extension of the model of spatial competition by Eaton 
and Lipsey (1975), who investigate the principle of minimum differentiation in the model of 
spatial competition by Hotelling (1929). They show that this principle, which had previously 
been assumed to be of wide applicability and which states that firms choose to differentiate as 
little as possible holds only for the case of two firms. In contrast, with three firms there exists no 
pure strategy equilibrium and with more than three firms the existence of a pure strategy 
equilibrium (that, if it exists, does not imply minimal differentiation) depends on the distribution 
of customers. 
Like firms (in the Eaton and Lipsey model) that compete for customers who are distributed 
along a line, we can consider a realistic analogy with respect to central banks of the leading 
currencies. Through their objective of price stability and with interest rate as a positioning 
instrument in a policy space, they attract small currencies that tie with leading currencies via 
exchange rate regimes. This process may be understood as if central banks of the leading 
currencies were competing for shares in currency holdings of small countries (i.e. those whose 
policy has a negligible impact), whose preferences for the policy of the central bank of a leading 
currency that they are linked to are distributed along a line. We show that under some changes in 
the assumptions, the results of the standard spatial competition model that are of interest to us 
continue to hold. Namely, stability in the case of two leading currencies, but instability in the 
case of three leading currencies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section two we present and analyze the formal 
theoretical model. Section three describes the data and brings empirical extensions to illustrate 
our point about the quest for equilibrium. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
2. Model and Equilibrium Analysis 
There are n leading currencies, each attached to one large country (or to a group of countries that 
form a monetary union). In addition there is a continuum of small countries, each with their own 
currency. A small country is defined by its monetary policy having only a negligible influence on 
world markets. The policy space of the central banks of the leading currencies is one-
dimensional. This one-dimensional policy is indeed the result of a set of policy choices, but for 
simplicity we collapse it into one single variable, an interest rate, which is the dominating policy 
instrument as well as the most significant loading factor of our formal generalization. Within this   6
policy space, there is a range which fulfills the basic goals of the central bank. Normalize this 
feasible policy space to [0, 1].
9 
As outlined in the introduction, the objective of a leading central bank in our model is price 
stability. The interest rate is its main instrument and is naturally used for positioning purposes 
within the policy space. In reality, usually price stability and, hence, some type of inflation 
management belong to the explicit goals of a central bank. Implicitly, central banks may be 
concerned about economic growth or trade deficit, since these are related to the bank’s foreign 
exchange reserves. Hence, these goals also serve to increase price stability, albeit indirectly.
10 
Using standard theory, the origin of a monetary base can be inferred from a country’s choice 
of an exchange rate regime. If a country favors a floating exchange regime then the monetary 
authority has full control over its monetary policy, by definition has no exchange rate policy, and 
the origin of the monetary base is entirely domestic. On the other hand, if a country prefers to 
peg its domestic currency to a foreign one, then the central bank de facto resigns from an 
independent monetary policy, conducts an explicit exchange rate policy, and the origin of 
a monetary base is purely foreign.
11 Any exchange rate regime in between the two extremes 
means a different extent of independence in both monetary and exchange rate policies as well as 
a mixed origin of the monetary base. Hence, by knowing the (true) adopted exchange regime we 
may identify the amount of domestic money (of a small currency) linked to a particular leading 
currency via the exchange rate regime and express this amount in terms of such leading currency. 
We define the dependencies of small currencies on leading currencies in the context of 
arguments given by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004). Based on a factual exchange regime we are 
able to trace the preference of small currencies’ central banks with respect to leading ones and in 
this way to classify shares in foreign currency holdings. Formally, let C be the amount of 
domestic currency expressed in terms of foreign leading currencies to which a domestic currency 
is linked via particular exchange rate regime, and  i c  be the part of C expressed in leading 
currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency basket.
12 Clearly  C c
n
i i = ∑ =1 . This 
                                                 
9 Replacing the interval by an open interval does not change the results. 
10 In any event, we do not want to be too definite about these goals since specific goals vary across central banks and 
it is our aim to keep the model general. 
11 In this context we can say that a leading currency “absorbs” the currency of a small country. 
12 Technically, C should also include foreign exchange reserves of central banks of small currencies held in leading 
currencies. However, since those foreign exchange reserves consist of currencies already issued by the leading 
central banks, we cannot consider them. Aside from this, the structure of foreign exchange reserves held usually   7
convenient notation covers all possible cases outlined above: 1) when n=0, then C=0 and small 
currency is floating; 2) when n=1, then small currency is pegged to a leading currency, and 3) 
when n>1, then small currency is under a currency basket peg regime.
13 
To summarize, leading central banks attract, through their policy choice, small currencies that 
tie with leading currencies via exchange rate regimes. Small countries have a preference over the 
location of the currency they are linked to. The most preferred locations of small countries are 
distributed with respect to a density f on [0, 1]. To assess the impact of such a link, the domestic 
money stock of a small currency may be expressed in terms of the foreign leading currency 
(currencies) to which the small currency is linked via specific exchange rate regime. 
Our basic assumption is that price stability for a large country i (with a leading currency) 
depends on two factors: the policy (interest rate) of the central bank, xi, and  the share  i s  of 
domestic currency, expressed in leading foreign currency i, that is held by small countries whose 
domestic currency is linked via specific exchange rate regime  to leading currencies. More 
precisely, the objective function of a central bank is  ( ) i i i s x G , , where  i G  is a proxy for price 
stability and is increasing in  i s  but decreasing in the absolute difference between its actual policy 
xi and its preferred policy i p .
14 Therefore, when choosing its policy, a leading central bank has to 
consider not only the direct effect on price stability, but also the indirect effect via the change in 
the share of small currencies linked to it.
15 
We analyze this interaction between central banks of leading currencies and those of small 
countries as a two-stage game. In this game, the central banks of leading currencies first decide 
simultaneously on their policy, i.e. of their location in the policy space, and then the small 
countries choose their foreign currency holdings. More precisely, the two stages are as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                             
reflects the weights of the leading currencies within the exchange rate regime. 
13 If a country favors, say, a currency basket peg, then weights of currencies in a basket are used to determine the 
importance of leading currencies with respect to small currency holdings. Since currencies in a basket usually 
represent currencies most frequently used in conduct of international monetary operations of a particular country, 
such an approach is justified. 
14 The objective function  i G  is increasing in  i s  since the connection of small currencies to a leading currency 
decreases volatility in the informal currency area, and hence fosters international trade and further stability. Such 
effects naturally reduce the costs of business activities. 
15 Devereux, Shi, and Xu (2004) deliver a model of monetary policy under a US dollar standard and describe how to 
conduct a monetary policy once a leading currency rounds up small currencies. Their work potentially can motivate 
our own, as well as lend support to our model which, besides other things, describes how to get to the point when 
small currencies are linked to leading currencies via foreign exchange standards.   8
1.  The n central banks choose simultaneously their locations  n x x ,..., 1 . Assume  n x x ≤ ≤ ... 1 . 
2.  After observing  n x x ,..., 1  the small countries choose their basket of leading currencies. 
They choose a mix between the closest leading currencies. More precisely, let l be the 
preferred location of a small country; as already mentioned, let C be the amount of 
domestic currency expressed in terms of foreign leading currencies to which a domestic 
currency is linked via a particular exchange rate regime, and  i c  be the part of C 
expressed in leading currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency basket 
( C c
n
i i = ∑ =1 ). If  1 x l ≤  then the country will choose a currency basket consisting only of 
currency 1,  C c = 1 ; in such a case a currency basket reduces to a simple peg. If  n x l ≥  
then the country will choose  C cn = . If  1 + ≤ ≤ i i x l x  then the country will choose a mix of 
currencies i and  1 + i , 
i i
i
x x
l x
i C c −
−
+
+ =
1
1 , 
i i
i
x x
x l
i C c −
−
+ + =
1 1 . Note that ( ) l C x c x c i i i i = + + + / 1 1  and 
that  C ci =  if  i x l = . If  i i x x = −1  then 
i i
i
x x
l x C
i i c c −
−
− +
+ = =
1
1
2 1  and similarly if  2 1 + + = i i x x  then 
i i
i
x x
x l C
i i c c −
−
+ + + = =
1 2 2 1  (and correspondingly if more than 2 x are identical).
16 
 
Assume for simplicity that C is identical for all small countries and normalize  1 = C . This can be 
achieved by replacing the density of small countries f by the density of in-foreign-currency-
expressed holdings 
∗ f  with  ()
( ) ( )
() () ∫
∗ = 1
0 dl l C l f
l C l f l f  for all  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ l , where  ( ) l C  denotes the average 
currency holding of the countries whose preferred location is l. Denote by  i s  the share of 
currency i of the total in-foreign-currency-expressed holdings by small countries. 
Each leading central bank has a preferred policy i p . As noted above, the aim of a leading 
central bank is to maximize  () i i i s x G , , where  i G  is assumed to be linear increasing in  i s  but the 
costs of deviating from the preferred policy pi (henceforth location costs) is convex in the 
absolute difference. More precisely let  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i p x L s s x G − − = ,  with  ( )( ) y L y L = − ,  ( ) 0 0 = ′ L  
and  () 0 > ′ ′ y L .
17 Assume furthermore for simplicity that the preferred policies of small countries 
are distributed according to a uniform distribution on [0,1] and that location costs are quadratic, 
                                                 
16 Modern monetary history documents that usually the number of currencies in a basket ranges from 2 to 5. The 
basket of currencies within the former EMS is an exception due to institutional setup. 
17 Note that the cost function is the same for all leading countries.   9
() ()
2 y a y L =  with  0 > a .
18 Since the leading economies are more alike than the whole spectrum 
of countries, the preferred locations of leading central banks are assumed to be relatively similar 
compared to the distribution of preferences of small banks. Furthermore, it appears that small 
deviations from the preferred locations have a relatively small impact on stability compared to 
i s , hence a is assumed to be small enough such that concerns for location costs do not dominate 
concerns for the share of currency holdings  i s . 
This model resembles the spatial competition model by Eaton and Lipsey (1975), but differs 
in three respects. First and most importantly, we introduce preferences of the leading central 
banks over their location in the policy space. Second, smaller countries do not exclusively 
choose the leading currency closest to their own preferred location, but a mix of respective 
closest currencies on both sides such that the weighted average location of these currencies 
corresponds to the preferred location l. Finally, central banks can choose identical locations in 
which case the linked countries choose baskets with equal shares in these currencies.
19 We show 
below that two central results of the basic spatial competition model, namely existence of a pure 
strategy equilibrium in the case of two central banks, but non-existence of a pure strategy 
equilibrium in the case of three central banks, continue to hold if location costs are not too high 
and if the preferred policies of leading central banks are relatively homogeneous compared to the 
distribution of preferred policies of smaller countries. 
 
Proposition 1: Let there be two leading currencies and let their preferred policies be  2 1 p p < . 
Then  
(a) There is an equilibrium  2
1
2 1 = = x x  if  a p 4
1
2
1
1 − ≥  and a p 4
1
2
1
2 + ≤ . The shares in 
equilibrium are  2
1
2 1 = = s s . 
(b) If  a p p 2
1
1 2 > −  and  ( ) a p p a p p 4
1 2
1 2 2 1 1 − − ≤ − − , then ( ) 2 1,x x  with  a p x 4
1
1 1 + =  and 
a p x 4
1
2 2 − =  forms an equilibrium. The shares in equilibrium are 
() ()
2 2 1 1
1 2 1 2 x x x x x s
+ − = + =  and 
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 1
x x x x x s
+ − − = + − = . 
(c) Otherwise there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
                                                 
18 We will elaborate below on generalizations. 
19 Such behavior can be observed during periods of post-war development and is a prominent feature of emerging 
economies during the last two decades of the 20th century.   10
 
Proof. (a) Assume  2 1 x x = . In that case all small countries choose  2
1
2 1 = = c c . 
Hence 2
1
2 1 = = s s . By deviating to  ε − 1 x  or  ε + 1 x  with  0 > ε  very small, central bank 1 can 
capture  ε − = 1 1 x s  or  ε − − 1 1 x  at a minimal increase in location costs. Hence unless 2
1
1 = x , 
central bank 1 has an incentive to deviate (as has central bank 2). Thus the only possible 
equilibrium with  2 1 x x =  is  2
1
2 1 = = x x . 
This is an equilibrium if the location costs are not too high for any of the banks. Consider first 
the case  2 2
1
1 p p < < . Observe that if  2 1 x x < ,  2 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
2
1
1 2
2 x x x x x
x x x
z x x dz x s
+ −
−
− = + = + = ∫  and hence 
2
1
1
1 = ∂
∂
x
s . Thus also the derivative of  i s  from the left at  2
1
2 1 = = x x  equals  2
1 . Since 
() () ( ) i i i i i i p x L x s x G − ′ − ′ = ′ , we get for the derivative from the left  () 0 2
1
1 > ′ G  if 
() () 2
1
1 2
1
1 2
1 2 ≤ − = − ′ p a p L  or  a p 4
1
2
1
1 − ≥ . In that case 1 has no incentive to marginally deviate 
from  2
1
1 = x  to  2
1
1 < x  if  2
1
2 = x  since its loss in  1 s  would not be compensated by a sufficient 
reduction of location costs. Since  0 > ′ ′ L  a deviation to any  2
1
1 < x  would not pay. Clearly, a 
deviation to  2
1
1 > x  does not pay, because it would yield a smaller  1 s  at higher location costs. 
Likewise, we derive for  2
1
2 > p  that the necessary and sufficient condition for 2 not to deviate to 
2
1
2 > x  if  2
1
1 = x  is  () () 2
1
2 2
1
2 2
1 2 − ≥ − = − ′ p a p L  or  a p 4
1
2
1
2 + ≤  (since  2
1
2
2 − = ∂
∂
x
s  for  1 2 x x > ). 
Similarly, if  2
1
1 2 > > p p  then the condition for bank 1 changes to  () 2
1
1 2
1 − ≥ − ′ p L  (which 
always holds if  () 2
1
2 2
1 − ≥ − ′ p L  since  0 > ′ ′ L ) and for  1 2 2
1 p p > >  the condition for bank 2 
changes to  () 2
1
2 2
1 ≤ − ′ p L  (which always holds if  ( ) 2
1
1 2
1 ≤ − ′ p L  since  0 > ′ ′ L ). 
For example, if  1 = a  then there is an equilibrium at  2
1  if  4
1
1 ≥ p  and  4
3
2 ≤ p . The range for  1 p  
and  2 p  such that  2
1
2 1 = = x x  is an equilibrium decreases in a. 
(b) If  2 2 1 1 p x x p < < <  and  ( ) 2
1
1 1 = − ′ p x L   ( ) a p x p x a 4
1
1 1 2
1
1 1 ) ( 2 + = ⇔ = − ⇔  and 
() 2
1
2 2 − = − ′ p x L   () a p x p x a 4
1
2 2 2
1
2 2 ) ( 2 − = ⇔ − = − ⇔  then since, as was shown above, 
2
1
1
1 = ∂
∂
x
s  and  2
1
2
2 − = ∂
∂
x
s ,  () ()0 2 2 1 1 = ′ = ′ x G x G  and hence neither bank 1 nor bank 2 has an incentive 
to marginally deviate (note that  0 > ′ ′ L  implies that if there is no incentive for a marginal   11
deviation, there is also no incentive for a larger deviation that preserves  2 1 x x < ). In this case, 
2 1 x x <  is obviously equivalent to  a p p 2
1
1 2 > − . 
Bank 1 would want to deviate from  1 x  to  ε + 2 x  only if 
() ( ) () ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 p x L p x L x x
x x − − − > + − −
− , that is the additional gain in currency holdings by 
switching to (a position slightly to the right of)  2 x  will overcompensate the increase in location 
costs.
20 Bank 1 would certainly not want to deviate to any larger x, because this would imply a 
smaller share at higher location costs. Note that there can only be an incentive for a deviation to 
ε + 2 x  if the preferred locations of the two leading central banks are relatively close together but 
off the median of f. Put differently, such an equilibrium exists, if the preferred locations of both 
banks are located rather symmetrically around  2
1 , are relatively far apart, or location costs are 
high. Note that  () 0 0 = ′ L  implies  2 2 1 1 p x x p < < <  since each bank would be willing to incur 
some location costs in order to increase its share  i s . 
By somewhat tedious, but straightforward computation we can show that 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) a
x x p p a p p p x L p x L x x 4
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 2 − − ≤ − − ⇔ − − − ≤ + − −
−  (note that the 
right-hand side is  0 >  since  a p p 2
1
1 2 > − ). 
Similarly, bank 2 has no incentive to deviate to  ε − 1 x  if 
( ) () () 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1 p x L p x L x x
x x − − − ≤ + − −
−  which is equivalent to 
() a p p a p p 4
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 − − ≤ − + . Hence no bank has an incentive to deviate if 
() a p p a p p 4
1 2
1 2 2 1 1 − − ≤ − − . 
Consider again  1 = a . Then if  2
1
1 2 > − p p  there is an equilibrium  4
1
2 2 − = p x  and 
4
1
1 1 + = p x  as long as  ( ) 4
1 2
1 2 2 1 1 − − ≤ − − p p p p . Thus in order for such an equilibrium to 
exist, the preferences of leading central banks have to be very different, but the range where such 
an equilibrium exists increases in a. 
(c) As was shown in (a) no equilibrium exists with  2
1
2 1 ≠ = x x . (b) states necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with  2 2 1 1 p x x p < < < . It is obvious that bank 1 would 
profit from deviating from an  1 x  with  2 1 1 x p x < < ,  1 2 1 p x x < < ,  1 1 2 x p x < <  or  1 2 1 x x p < <  
                                                 
20 In the following, we will ignore ε in the share and also in the costs because it can be arbitrarily small.   12
because 1 could simultaneously increase  1 s  and lower location costs. Similarly  1 2 2 x p x < < , 
2 1 2 x x p < < ,  2 2 1 x p x < <  and  2 1 2 p x x < <  are impossible. This covers all possible 
constellations of locations. If there is a “smallest policy unit ε”, then there could in principle be 
constellations  1 2 1 p x x < − = ε . Bank 1 would then not wish to deviate to  2 x  (or anything larger) 
if  2 1 s s > . But in that case bank 2 would want to deviate to  1 x  (as long as ε is small enough such 
that the increase in location costs is negligible). This leads to the requirement  2
1
1 2
1 ≤ ≤ − x ε  and 
we are essentially back in case (a). The remaining cases with the smallest possible policy unit 
would be solved in a similar way. QED 
If neither the condition for case (a) nor (b) holds, the intuition for the non-existence of the 
equilibrium is as follows: there is an x with  2
1
1 < < x p  such that if  x x > 2 , the marginal location 
cost for bank 1 at x would be  2
1  such that x would be the preferred location of bank 1, but the 
marginal location costs for bank 2 would be greater than  ) ( 2
1 −  so that bank 2 would be willing to 
push even further to the left to increase  2 s , so both would choose the same x, which cannot be an 
equilibrium unless  2
1 = x . Hence non-existence of equilibrium requires sufficient asymmetry of 
the leading central banks with respect to their preferred locations, and an intermediate level of 
location costs. If their preferred locations are not too asymmetric with respect to the median of 
the distribution costs of small countries, then if location costs are low, there is an equilibrium at 
2
1  and if location costs are high, there is an equilibrium with  2 1 x x ≠ . 
The above logic also applies to more general distributions of the preferred locations of small 
countries and to more general convex location costs. In particular, if L is sufficiently small and 
the preferred policies of the two leading countries are relatively close to the median of f, then 
there is an equilibrium where both choose policies equal to the median. If the preferred locations 
are rather different and location costs are high, then there is an equilibrium where they choose 
different locations (which are, however, closer together than their preferred locations). In the first 
case, where concerns for location costs are dominated by concerns for the share of small 
countries, the minimal differentiation result remains true, whereas if location costs dominate 
concerns for shares in small countries, there is an equilibrium with unequal locations. 
Note that since conditions (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive, the equilibrium (if it exists) is 
unique. Hence in a repeated game the equilibrium play will be repeated and the situation is stable   13
in the sense that the policies of the two leading currencies are stable over time and that small 
countries do not change their exchange rate regimes. In the case of an equilibrium of type (a) the 
policies will change if, due to external shocks, the preferred policies of the small countries shift. 
They will, however, change in a parallel fashion provided that the shift is not too radical, because 
the equilibrium policies will stay at the median as long as the condition in (a) remains fulfilled. 
The policies will, however, not change if the preferred policies of the leading countries shift as 
long as condition (a) remains true. But they will shift if the equilibrium is of type (b). 
Furthermore, if the preferred locations of the leading countries move closer together over time, 
we can move from an equilibrium of type (b) to one of type (a) (if preferred locations are 
relatively symmetric to the median of f) or to non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (if 
they are highly asymmetric). 
 
Proposition 2: Let  3 = n  and  3 2 1 p p p < < . 
(a) If 
(1)  a p p 4
1
1 2 ≥ − ,  
(2)  a p p 4
1
2 3 ≥ − ,  
(3)  ()
2
1 2 16
7
2 2 1
3 2 p p a p a
p p − ≤ + − + , 
(4)  ()
2
2 3 16
7
3 2 2
2 1 1 p p a p a
p p − ≤ + − − + , 
(5)  ()
2
1 2 16
3
2 2 2
3 1 p p a p a
p p − ≤ − + − − , 
(6)  ()
2
2 3 16
3
2 2 2
3 1 1 p p a p a
p p − ≤ − + + − − , 
then () a a p p p 4
1
3 2 4
1
1 , , − +  is an equilibrium. 
The equilibrium shares are 
2 2 2
4
1
2 1 2 1 1 2
1
*
1
a p p p x x p
x s
+ +
=
+
=
−
+ = , 
2 2
2
1
1 3 1 3 *
2
a p p x x
s
− −
=
−
= , and 
2
1
2
1
2
1
4
1
2 3 2 3 2 3
3
*
3
a p p p x p x
x s
− +
− =
+
− =
−
+ − = . 
Conditions (5) and (6) are actually not very restrictive and hold quite generally (e.g. if   1 ≤ a , 
then (5) holds whenever (1) and (3) hold and (6) holds whenever (2) and (4) hold). 
 
(b) Let  a p x 4
1
3 3 − =  and  3 1
3 x x = . If  a p x p 4
1
1 1 2 + ≤ ≤  and   14
(7)  3 2 3
4
3 18
5 2
3 9
8
3 9
8 2 1 p ap ap p
p
a − + − + ≤ , 
then  () 3 1 1 , , x x x  is an equilibrium. The equilibrium shares are  3
1
12
1
3 1
*
2
*
1
3 < − = = = a
p x s s , 
3
1
6
1
3 3
2
3 3
2
2 3
*
3 1 1 1
1 3 > + − = − = + − =
−
a
x x p x x s . 
Note that independent of a, a necessary requirement is 
a a a a p x x x p x p p 4
1
2 4
1
1 4
1
1 3 4
1
2 3 2 3 2 2 + ≥ + = + − ≥ + − = − , whereas  a p p 4
1
1 2 ≤ − , hence the 
preferences of bank 2 are much closer to those of bank 1 than to those of bank 3. Thus in 
equilibrium bank 1 and 2 choosing the same policy resembles the formation of a monetary 
(policy) union of two banks with similar preferences. 
 
(c) Let  a p x 4
1
1 1 + =  and  3
2
3
1+ =
x x . If  2 3 4
1
3 p x p a ≤ ≤ −  and 
(8)  1 2 2 2 2
5 2
1 1 1 12 12 3 4 8 4 8 2 p ap ap p a ap ap p a + − + + + − + ≥ , 
then  () 3 3 1 , , x x x  is an equilibrium. The equilibrium shares are 
a
x x p x x s 6
1
3
1
1 3
2
3
1
1 3
2
2 1
*
1
1 3 + + = + = + =
− ,  a
p x s s 12
1
3 3
1
3
*
3
*
2
1 1 − − = − = = . 
This is just a mirror image of case (b). 
 
(d) Otherwise there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
Before proving Proposition 2, consider again the case  1 = a  for illustration. Conditions (1) and 
(2) imply that an equilibrium of type (a) only exists if  4
1
2 3 ≥ − p p  and  4
1
1 2 ≥ − p p , that is if 
preferred locations of leading central banks are highly heterogeneous. Conditions (3) and (4) are 
even more restrictive, implying for example for  0 1 = p  and  2
1
2 = p  that  4
15
3 ≥ p  or for  2
1
2 = p  
and 1 3 = p  that  4
15
1 1− ≤ p . The range where an equilibrium exists increases in a. An 
equilibrium of type (b) only exists if the preferences of banks 1 and 2 are relatively similar and 
those of bank 3 are quite different. In particular even for  1 3 = p  and hence  4
3
3 = x ,  4
1
2 1 ≤ < p p  
is necessary. Hence an equilibrium in pure strategies exists only if preferences are highly 
heterogeneous or if location costs are very high. If, as we argued above, leading central banks are 
relatively homogeneous in their preferences compared to small countries and if the weight they 
attach to small countries being linked to their currency is large compared to the costs of marginal 
deviations from the preferred policy, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies with  3 = n , but   15
with  2 = n  there is an equilibrium where both leading banks choose a policy at the median of f, 
i.e. the basic results of the standard spatial competition model still hold.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
(a) 
Step 1: bank 2 does not want to deviate: 
Note that for all  2 x  with  3 2 1 x x x < < ,  ( ) 1 3 2
1
2 x x s − =  and hence bank 2 has no incentive to 
deviate to any such  2 x  since this will not affect  2 s  but will cause positive location costs. If bank 
2 deviates to  ε − = 1 2 x x , then its share is  1 x  (we will again ignore ε in the share and also in the 
costs because it can be arbitrarily small). So deviating does not pay if the gain in  2 s  is smaller 
than the incurred location costs, i.e. if  ( ) 2 1
*
2 1 p x L s x − ≤ −  which is (as again tedious but 
straightforward computation shows) equivalent to (3). If bank 2 deviates to  1 x , then  2 2 2
1
*
2 x s s + = , 
so if deviating to  ε − 1 x  does not pay, deviating to  1 x  definitely does not pay. If bank 2 deviates 
to  ε + = 3 2 x x  then  3 2 1 x s − = , so deviating does not pay if  () 2 3
*
2 3 1 p x L s x − ≤ − −  which is 
equivalent to (4). If bank 2 deviates to  3 x , then  2
1
2 2
3
*
2 x s s
− + = , so if deviating to  ε + 3 x  does not 
pay, then deviating to  3 x  definitely does not pay. 
Step 2: bank 1 does not want to deviate: 
Since  () () 2
1
4
1
1 1 = ′ = − ′ a L p x L  the marginal location costs of bank 1 at  1 x  are equal to the 
marginal gain in  1 s , hence bank 1 has no incentive to marginally deviate and condition (1) is 
equivalent to  2 1 p x ≤ .  Since  0 > ′ ′ L  bank 1 has no incentive to deviate to any  2 p x < . 
Bank 1 does not want to deviate to any x with  3 2 x x p < < : Note that  2 1
2 3 p x s
− =  for all such x. 
Hence 1 would, if anything choose  ε + 2 p . Bank 1 will not deviate to   ε + 2 p  if 
() ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 3 p x L p p L
x p p x − − − ≤ −
+ − , which is equivalent to (5). 
Bank 1 does not want to deviate to  ε + 3 x  because bank 2 does not want to deviate to  ε + 3 x , 
as can be seen by the following argument. For ease of notation let  1 x A = ,  1 2 x p B − = , 
2 3 p x C − =  and  3 1 x D − = . Assume that bank 1 wants to deviate to  ε + 3 x , i.e. 
() ()
2
1 1
2
1 3 2 p x a p x a A D B − − − > − − , but bank 2 does not, i.e.  ()
2
2 3 2 p x a D
B C − ≤ −
+ . Observe   16
that 
() () ( ) ( ) = − − − + − = − − −
2
1 1
2
1 2 2 3
2
1 1
2
1 3 p x a p p p x a p x a p x a  
() () ( ) ( )( )( )2
2
2 3 1 2 2 3
2
1 1
2
1 2
2
2 3 2
C p x a p p p x a p x a p p a p x a + − ≥ − − + − − − + − = . 
Hence the above assumptions imply  ( ) 2 2
2
2 3 2
B C B D p x a A D − ≥ + − > − −  which can obviously 
not be true. 
By deviating to  2 p , bank 1 would obtain the average of the shares that it obtains at  ε − 2 p  
and  ε + 2 p , so if it does not want to deviate to either of these, it does not want to deviate to  2 p  
either, and by a parallel argument it does not want to deviate to  3 x . 
Deviating to any other location is dominated because it yields the same or a lower  1 s  at a 
higher location cost than one of the options discussed above.  
 
Step 3: bank 3 does not want to deviate: 
The situation of bank 3 is symmetric to that of bank 1 and hence the conditions are derived in 
a similar way. Condition (2) ensures that  2 3 p x ≥  and since  ( ) 2
1
4
1 = ′ a L  bank 3 would not like to 
marginally deviate and because of  0 > ′ ′ L  would not want to deviate to any  2 p x > . 
Bank 3 would not want to deviate to  ε − 2 p  if 
() ( ) ( ) 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 1
2 3 1 2 p x L p p L x
p x x p − − − ≤ − − −
− − , which is equivalent to (6). Again, because  3 s  
would be identical for all locations x with  2 1 p x x < < , bank 3 would not want to deviate to any 
such x either. 
Bank 3 would not want to deviate to  ε − 1 x  if bank 2 does not want to. As above, assume the 
opposite. This implies (with the above notation) that  ( )( )
2
3 3
2
1 3 2 x p a x p a D A
C − − − > − −  but 
()
2
1 2 2 x p a A
C B − ≤ −
+ . Note that  
() () ( ) ( ) = − − − + − = − − −
2
3 3
2
1 2 2 3
2
3 3
2
1 3 x p a x p p p a x p a x p a  
() ( ) ( ) ( )( )≥ − − + − − − + − = 1 2 2 3
2
3 3
2
2 3
2
1 2 2 x p p p a x p a p p a x p a () 2
2
1 2
B x p a + −  
Together this implies  ( ) 2 2
2
1 2 2
C B C A x p a D A − ≥ + − > − − , obviously a contradiction.  
As for bank 1, deviating to any other location does not pay because it implies a lower or 
identical share at higher costs than one of the possible deviations discussed above (and   17
deviations to  2 p  or  1 x  do not pay by an argument parallel to that for bank 1). 
The above analysis shows that conditions (1) to (6) are sufficient for () 3 2 1 , , x p x  being an 
equilibrium, but also necessary for an equilibrium with  3 2 1 x p x < <  and 3 2 1 x x x < < . 
(b)  
Step 1: banks 1 and 2 do not want to deviate: Note that since  3 1 3 x x =  we have  2 1
1 3 x x x
− = . If 
either bank 1 or bank 2 deviated to  ε − 1 x  it would obtain  1 x , if it deviated to  ε + 1 x  it would 
obtain  1 2
1 3 x
x x =
− , staying at  1 x  yields half of both, hence also  1 x . So there is no incentive for a 
marginal deviation. Note that all x with  3 1 x x x < <  yield  2
1 3 x x s
− =  but since  1 2 1 x p p ≤ <  the 
location costs are higher and hence a deviation to any such x does not pay. A deviation to  1 x x <  
implies a reduction of s by  2
1 x x − . Since  a p x p x 4
1
1 1 2 1 ≤ − < −  we have 
() () 2
1
1 1 2 1 ≤ − ′ < − ′ p x L p x L . Thus the decrease in location costs is smaller than the loss in s and 
a deviation to  1 x x <  does not pay. Finally, a deviation to  ε + 3 x  does not pay for bank 2 if 
() () 2 1 2 3 1 3 1 p x L p x L x x − − − ≤ − − , which is equivalent to (7). Since  0 > ′ ′ L  and  2 1 p p < , 
() () () ( ) 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 p x L p x L p x L p x L − − − > − − − , and thus deviating to  ε + 3 x  does not pay for 
bank 1 if it does not pay for bank 2. 
 
Step 2: bank 3 does not want to deviate: since  a p x 4
1
3 3 − = ,  ( ) 2
1
3 3 − = − ′ p x L  and hence bank 3 
does not want to deviate to any  1 x x > . Since  1 3
1 *
3 x s > > , a deviation to  ε − 1 x  or  1 x  implies a 
lower share at a higher location cost and hence bank 3 has no incentive to deviate.  
 
(c) This is just the symmetric situation to (b). The proof is essentially identical. 
(d) There are no further equilibria. 
Step 1: as established above, the equilibrium in (a) is the only equilibrium with  3 2 1 x p x < <  and 
3 2 1 x x x < < . There can be no equilibrium with  3 2 1 x x x < <  but  1 2 x p ≤ , because in that case 
bank 2 could, by deviating to x with  2 1 x x x < < , obtain the same  2 s  at lower location costs.
21 By 
                                                 
21 If there is a “smallest policy unit ε” then there could be an equilibrium where 3 2 1 x x x < <  but  1 2 x p ≤ , namely 
if  ε + = 1 2 x x  and  2 s  is larger than  1 s , but in that case bank 1 would have an incentive to deviate to  2 x , unless   18
a parallel argument, there is also no equilibrium with  3 2 1 x x x < <  but  2 3 p x ≤ . Hence the 
equilibrium in (a) is the only equilibrium with  3 2 1 x x x < < . 
 
Step 2:  3 2 1 x x x < =  implies  2 1
1 3 x x x
− =  otherwise bank 1 or 2 could, by a marginal deviation, 
increase its share at essentially 0 increase in location costs. This then implies  1 2 1 x p p ≤ <   
because any x with  3 1 x x x < <  yields the same share, so if  1 2 x p > , bank 2 could obtain the 
same share at lower location costs. Hence the equilibrium in (b) is the only equilibrium with  
3 2 1 x x x < = . 
 
Step 3: by the same argument as in step 2, the only equilibrium with  3 2 1 x x x = <  is the 
equilibrium in (c).  
 
Step 4:  3 2 1 x x x = =  cannot be an equilibrium: in this case  3
1 = i s  and by a marginal deviation 
bank i could obtain  () 2
1
1 1 1 , max ≥ − x x . 
Step 5: in equilibrium  3 1 2 x x x ≤ <  is impossible, because in that case  1 1 x p <  or  2 2 p x <  and 
hence one bank could lower its location costs while increasing or retaining its share (note that as 
was argued in the proof of part (b), if in equilibrium  3 1 x x =  then  3 2 1
2 3 x
x x − =
− , so by deviating to 
x with  3 2 x x x < < , bank 1 would obtain the same  1 s , as it is also the case for  3 1 x x < ). On the 
other hand,  3 1 2 x x x < =  corresponds to the equilibrium in (b), so all cases  3 1 2 x x x ≤ ≤  are 
covered (in case of equality of all x, step 4 applies). 
 
Step 6: the argument why any constellation,  2 3 1 x x x < ≤ ,  1 3 2 x x x ≤ ≤ ,  1 2 3 x x x ≤ ≤ , 
2 1 3 x x x ≤ ≤  cannot occur in equilibrium is the same as in step 5: at least one bank can reduce its 
location costs without reducing its share if at least one inequality is strict; otherwise the 
argument of step 4 applies.   
This covers all possible constellations of  1 x ,  2 x , and  3 x  and shows that no equilibrium except 
for those in (a), (b), and (c) exist. QED 
                                                                                                                                                             
the difference in shares is very small, so this essentially corresponds to the equilibrium in (b).   19
 
The qualitative results of proposition 2 should also hold for more general convex cost functions 
and more general distributions of preferences of small countries.
22 In particular, if central banks’ 
preferences are relatively homogeneous compared to the preferences of small countries and 
location costs are not excessively high, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. The logic is the 
same as in the standard spatial competition model: banks 1 and 3 would like to choose locations 
close to 2 x . In that case  2 s  would be small, but bank 2 could increase  2 s  at only a small increase 
in location costs by deviating to  ε − 1 x  or to  ε + 3 x . 
In a repeated game the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium means that the actual 
choices of central banks in period t are not in equilibrium. Therefore, at least one central bank 
would like to change its location. Hence the configuration of locations of leading central banks 
will change from period t to period  1 + t , even without external shocks and even not in a parallel 
fashion. Put differently, there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium, and these mixed strategies 
will (in general) yield different realizations and hence different locations of leading currencies in 
each period. As a consequence, the currency baskets of (at least some of the) smaller countries 
will also change from period to period.
23 
The difference between the cases  2 = n  and  3 = n  can be summarized as follows. If leading 
central banks’ preferences are highly heterogeneous or location costs are very high, then both for 
2 = n  and  3 = n  there exists an equilibrium where central banks choose different locations. But 
if, as we assume, leading central banks’ preferences are relatively similar compared to the 
distribution of small countries’ preferences and location costs are not very high, then the result of 
the model without location costs survives, namely that for  2 = n  there is an equilibrium where 
both central banks choose a policy at the median of the distribution of small countries’ 
preferences, and if  3 = n , then there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Corresponding results 
for  3 > n  can be derived by a similar extension of Eaton and Lipsey (1975). This, however, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
                                                 
22 In the latter case,  2 2 p x =  would in general not hold any more in equilibrium, because the density f is not 
constant and hence  2 s is not the same for all  2 x with  3 2 1 x x x < < .  
23 Such behavior can be observed in case of emerging countries in our sample.   20
3. Data and Statistical Inference 
3.1 Data and Quantitative Evidence 
We collected data on exchange rates of domestic currencies with respect to the US dollar,  to the 
Deutsch mark/ECU/euro, and the Japanese yen. Furthermore, we assembled data on monetary 
aggregate (M2), short-term and long-term interest rate, and nature of exchange rate regime for 30 
OECD countries plus Russia. Short-term interest rates are defined as three-month money market 
rates, or rates on similar financial instruments. The span of our yearly data is from 1953 to 2002, 
with the exception of emerging countries where meaningful data are available only from the mid- 
1980s. All data were assembled from OECD Economic Outlook statistics, International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF and, for particular missing data, from the central banks and ministries of 
finance of the respective countries. In order to observe dependencies of small currencies on 
leading currencies we used the description of de facto (true) exchange regimes provided in 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004). We consider the OECD countries, due to their economic capacity 
and derived amount of monetary aggregate used, as a proxy for the world.
24 
The overall situation from the 1950s to 2002 is captured in Figures 2-5. They illustrate how 
the share of monetary aggregate linked to leading currencies as well as the share of countries 
linked through their exchange rate regimes to leading currencies evolved over time. We see a 
massive outflow from the US dollar after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, and an 
equally pronounced gain in Europe. While the share of currencies linked to the US dollar 
stabilized in the late 1980s, European currency has been solidifying its share steadily. The share 
of currencies not linked to any leading currency never exceeds 30% and meanders with time. The 
share of monetary aggregate of these countries tends to be negligible. The Japanese yen 
represents a significant share of money that is linked to it, hovering around 30% of the total. 
Figure 6 presents the total amount of monetary aggregate of all considered currencies divided 
among three groups in terms of the exchange rate regime link. The link of a currency is either to 
the US dollar, to the Deutsch mark/ECU/euro, or to the Japanese yen. In the context of our model 
we see a clearly dominant position of the US dollar from the 1950s to 1971. This equals a 
situation in which the number of leading currencies is just one; n = 1. Period 1971-1977 
represents a transition after the Bretton Woods System ceased to work. We see a departure from 
state n = 1 towards n > 1. During this period there exist no obvious candidates that would firmly 
                                                 
24Because of this, we do not incorporate into our sample a number of small countries.   21
establish a situation of two leading currencies in which n = 2. Figure 7 illustrates the 
development after 1978: the amount of monetary aggregate of currencies that are linked neither 
to the US dollar nor to the Deutschmark/ECU/euro indicates that there are not two dominating 
currencies. Most of the non-linked aggregate originates in Japan, but not all. Hence, the post-
1978 period represents a situation in which, in the framework of our model, unquestionably n > 2 
and no equilibrium exists. 
Short-term interest rates (Figure 8) allow us to detect changes in the positioning of central 
banks of the leading currencies in one-dimensional space. Short-term interest rates vary 
extensively and they do not move in a parallel fashion. The differences among the short-term 
rates are relatively small and the differential between Japanese and US/European rates becomes 
slightly pronounced only in the 1990s. Such behavior is consistent with our model specification, 
which assumes that central banks use interest rate for positioning purposes in their one-
dimensional space. Evidence shows that interest rates interact over time; disparities due to 
central banks altering the interest rate have been quickly adjusted for. 
 
3.2 Empirical Econometrics and Statistical Inference 
In order to verify the prediction of the model we test the following hypothesis using the data 
described. We assume in our model that the central bank of a leading currency uses interest rate 
as a policy instrument for its positioning purposes within one-dimensional space. Our model 
predicts that a change in this instrument ultimately leads to a change in the choice of small 
countries with respect to their ties to leading currencies. Hence, based on our model we should 
witness a link from a central bank (of a leading currency) interest rate (it) to the extent of money 
tied to a leading currency via exchange rate regime (mt). We proceed to verify the model’s 
prediction by using the concept of Granger-causality. 
Since Granger (1969) introduced his definition of ‘causality’, the test of Granger-type 
causality has been applied frequently in empirical work, including studies on links among a wide 
array of macroeconomic variables.
25 This methodology for testing linkages has become standard 
and well known. In general, we say that “{xt} causes {yt}” if the present value of yt can be 
predicted significantly better when past values of xt are included in our specification. Usually the 
                                                 
25 For applications using monetary variables see Thornton and Batten (1985), Sauer and Scheide (1995), Hess and 
Porter (1993), Masih and Masih (1998), and Lee (1997) among others.   22
notion of ‘causality’ in economic systems is limited to linear relations between observed time 
series. The Granger causality is then tested via an autoregressive representation in the form: 
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where L denotes the lag operator. 
Because disturbances are serially uncorrelated, the test for the direction of causality between 
{xt} and {yt} can be turned into standard tests of whether b(L)=0 and c(L)=0, respectively.
26 The 
testing can proceed only if some restrictions on the autoregressive form (xt) are specified before 
the actual estimation. Particularly, the length of autoregression should be identified prior to the 
estimation of (xt). We applied Hsiao's (1981) two-step approach to determine the length of the 
lag structure. The “optimal lengths” were estimated applying standard information criteria (See 
Akaike, 1969; Hannan and Quinn, 1979; Schwarz, 1978), all of them suggesting that only one 
lag of both variables be used. 
Hence, our model for testing the potential causal relationship between interest rate and money 
is specified as follows: 
 
(10) 
t t t t
t t t t
i m i
i m m
ν δ γ
ε β α
+ + =
+ + =
− −
− −
1 1
1 1 , 
where it is a short-term interest rate and mt is a money aggregate (as defined in Section 2). Within 
the framework of the Granger causality the first hypothesis is formulated that a change in interest 
rate does not Granger-cause a change in the amount of money linked to a particular leading 
currency ( 0 : 0 = β H ). Analogously, the second hypothesis captures no causal link from money 
to short-term interest rate ( 0 : 0 = δ H ). Results are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The test of the hypothesis ‘{xt} causes {yt}’ is equivalent to the test of the restriction b(L)=0. Similarly, the 
opposite direction of causality can be tested via the restriction c(L)=0.   23
Table 1 
Interest rate of a central bank of a leading currency and total amount of money linked to a 
particular leading currency: Granger-causality results 
 
Variable linked to 
currency of: 
Granger Causality 
Link  Estimated equation 
Link from interest 
rate to money
  1
*
1
* *
) 002 . 0 (
004 . 0
) 044 . 0 (
927 . 0
− − + = t t t i m m  
Europe 
No link from money 
to interest rate 
1 1
* *
) 356 . 1 (
260 . 0
) 047 . 0 (
992 . 0
− − − = t t t m i i  
Link from interest 
rate to money
  1
*
1
* *
) 001 . 0 (
002 . 0
) 026 . 0 (
956 . 0
− − + = t t t i m m  
Japan 
No link from money 
to interest rate 
1 1
* *
) 047 . 1 (
833 . 0
) 040 . 0 (
998 . 0
− − − = t t t m i i  
Link from interest 
rate to money
  1
*
1
* *
) 002 . 0 (
005 . 0
) 038 . 0 (
867 . 0
− − + = t t t i m m  
USA 
No link from money 
to interest rate 
1 1
* *
) 867 . 0 (
533 . 0
) 050 . 0 (
957 . 0
− − + = t t t m i i  
** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Results from Table 1 show that for all leading currencies we have found a statistically 
significant link from interest rate to money tied to leading currencies via exchange rate regime. 
In addition, we have not found a reverse causal relationship. These two sets of results combined 
are fully consistent with and support predictions of our theoretical model. In all models we 
verified the co-integration of the time series studied by performing the ADF test on residuals. In 
all cases we have rejected the null hypothesis of no co-integration at 1% significance level. 
Further, by using the Durbin-Watson h-alternative test, residuals were detected to be free of 
autocorrelation. 
 
4. Final remarks 
The theoretical model that we present in this paper is based on the idea of spatial competition 
and rests on a set of realistic assumptions related to the behavior of central banks, the working of 
exchange rate regimes, and international monetary arrangements in general. We show that 
although stable equilibrium of exchange rates can arise in the case of two leading currencies,   24
instability is a prominent feature in the case of three leading currencies.  
We support the implications of our model with both quantitative evidence and formal 
statistical inference. Our empirical results back up the predictions of our theoretical model. We 
find a statistically significant link from the interest rate to money tied to leading currencies via 
exchange rate regime; we do not find a reverse causal relationship, though. 
Our results have stirring implications with respect to recent developments. As the euro has 
gained value against the dollar, central banks in Japan, China, and other Asian countries have 
bought dollars to hold down the value of their own currencies. The total reserves of the four 
largest Asian economies - China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - have more than doubled over 
the 2001-2003 period and reached 1.5 trillion US dollars, most of it held in American 
government securities. China itself keeps its currency tightly pegged to the US dollar, which 
greatly upsets non-dollar allied Europe that appeals to China to let its currency float and to Japan 
to discontinue its interventions on the yen-dollar market. Its rationale behind such a claim is to 
enhance the stability among exchange rates of the leading currencies. Our conclusions would 
indicate just the opposite. In fact if China keeps its link to the dollar and Japan pegs the yen in 
some way, then our model predicts that the overall situation will lean towards the two-currency 
equilibrium. 
Since firms, traders, and countries currently recognize three leading currencies and their 
economic behavior reflects this, we may expect disagreement on overvaluation or undervaluation 
of certain currencies to continue. Under current monetary arrangements, attaining stability 
among the exchange rates of leading currencies is about as likely as squaring a circle.   25
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 Figure 1.   Exchange Rate Deviations. (March 1973 = 100) 
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Note: euro refers to euro from 1999 onwards and to DEM and ECU prior to this date. Official fixed parities are used 
to calculate respective exchange rate.  Since the figure is in deviations, it doesn’t matter whether DEM, ECU, or 
euro is used as a common denominator.  
 
 Figure 2. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the US Dollar 
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 Figure 3. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the DEM/ECU/euro 
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 Figure 4. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the Japanese yen 
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  Figure  5.  Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Not-linked to any of the 
Leading Currencies 
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 Figure 6.  Relative Share of Money Linked to Leading Currencies (Long Period, 1953-2002) 
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 Figure 7. Relative Share of Money Linked to Leading Currencies (Short Period, 1978-2002) 
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  Figure 8.   Short-term Interest Rates of the Leading Currencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: euro refers to euro from 1999 onwards and to DEM and ECU prior to this date. Short-term 
interest rates for the period prior to 1999 are associated with DEM.   31
Figure 8.   Short-term Interest Rates of the Leading Currencies 
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Note: euro refers to euro from 1999 onwards and to DEM and ECU prior to this date. Short-term 
interest rates for the period prior to 1999 are associated with DEM. 
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